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By letter of 14 August 1975 the President of the Council of the European 
communities requested the European Parliament to deliver an opinion on the 
proposal from the commission of the European Communities to the Council for a 
directive concerning the harmonization of systems of company taxation and of 
withholding taxes on dividends. 
On 2 September 1975 the President of the European Parliament referred 
this proposal to the Committee on Budgets as the committee responsible and 
to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for its opinion. 
on 16 September 1975 the Committee on Budgets appointed Mr Artzinger 
rapporteur. 
It considered this proposal at its meeting of 18 March 1976. 
Following Mr Artzinger's resignation, Mr van Aerssen was appointed 
rapporteur on 16 March 1977. 
At its meeting of 22 September 1977 the committee considered the report 
and adopted it unanimously with one abstention. 
Present: Mr Bangemann, vice-chairman and acting chairman; Mr van Aerssen, 
rapporteur; Lord Bruce of Donington, Mr Dalyell, Mr Mascagni, Mr Meintz, 
Mr Notenboom, Mr Radoux, Mr Schreiber, Mr Shaw, Mr Spinelli and Mr Yeats. 
The opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is 
attached. 
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A 
The Conunittee on Budgets hereby submits to.the European Parliament the 
following motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RES·OLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the 
Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a directive 
concerning the harmonization of systems of company taxation and of withholding 
taxes on dividends 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposal from the Conunission of the European 
. t' 1 Communi ies , 
- having been consulted by the Council (Doc. 228/75), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the opinion of 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (Doc. 291/77 ), 
(a) whereas the European Parliament, as long ago as 1970, called for the 
harmonization of the systems of company taxation in the Member States in 
implementation of the objectives of Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, 
(b) whereas a free and common capital market permitting the unimpeded 
movement of dividends is a basic prerequisite for the elimination of 
distortions of competition in connection with the investment and location 
decisions of undertakings and for the neutral taxation of shareholders, 
(c) whereas the Council resolution of 22 March 1971 set a clear political 
objective, 
1. Approves the Commission's proposal; 
2. Draws particular attention, in view of the fact that not all Member States 
are equally willing to accept integration, to the need, in an initial 
stage, to embark only on the harmonization of systems in a way which will 
not affect revenue, and to leave to a later stage the approximation of 
bases of assessment, taxation rates and tax credits; 
1 OJ No. C 253, 5.11.1975, p.2 
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3. Endorses the rejection of the 'classical' system as a European solution, 
since the former would: 
(a) tend to give too much encouragement to self-financing and financing 
thrcugh loans by equating distributed and non-distributed profits; 
(b) run counter to the principle of fiscal neutrality for the various 
legal forms of undertaking in view of the double taxation of 
companies as opposed to partnerships and other economic entities; and 
(c) increase the opportunity for tax evasion by failing to provide 
adequate safeguards in the form of deductions at source; 
4. Regrets that, in its proposal, the Commission has not given sufficiently 
detailed consideration to the alternatives of full imputation, split 
rates and primary dividends; 
5. Nevertheless agrees with the Commission, for the reasons indicated below, 
that partial imputation is the only system likely to yield satisfactory 
results at Community level: 
(a) in view of the high maximum rates of income tax in certain Member 
States, and on the premise that corporation tax would have to be 
based on these maximum rates, the full imputation system would 
inevitably lead to losses of revenue for the exchequers concerned; 
(b) the split-rate system does not permit flexible tax relief, since any 
such relief under this system automatically affects all shareholders 
alike; and 
(c) the system of preferentially taxed primary dividends has always been 
a rare feature of European company tax law; 
6. Takes the view that the advantages of the partial imputation system could 
make satisfactory application feasible at Community level because: 
(a) it represents a realistic compromise between the 'classical' system 
and the system of full relief which, once implemented, would make it 
possible to prevent isolation of the European financial markets and 
to achieve maximum neutrality with r~gard to competition; 
(b) it largely guarantees fiscal equity for the various forms of under-
taking but at the same time tends to cancel out the advantage of 
limited liability capital accumulation by taxing companies more 
heavily than partnerships; and 
(c) by favouring small investors, it should have a positive effect on 
share markets and thus take account of the social desirability of 
a broader spread of production capital; 
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7. calls on the Conunission to draw up, in the light of the present directive, 
the intended directive on investment funds and to submit it without delay; 
B. Takes the view that the withholding tax also proposed is absolutely 
essential, even though the additional collection of taxes might to some 
extent complicate the system; 
9. Warns against the danger of underestimating the practical difficulties 
of partial imputation as regards parent corporations and their subsidiaries 
and tax compensation between the Member States, since such difficulties 
could call into question the feasibility of the entire harmonization 
effort; therefore recommends a number of technical improvements relating 
to tax credits and their application and to fiscal compensation and the 
relevant implementing provisions; 
10. Feels that the directive should include express provisions to ensure that 
the non-imputation of credits against income tax in third countries does 
not lead to protectionist discrimination against non-Conununity investors; 
accordingly emphasizes the need for tax agreements to be concluded with 
third countries on this matter; 
11. Stresses that the proposed tax harmonization must neither undermine nor 
invalidate the principles and objectives contained in the Accession 
Treaties and associated acts; 
12. Consequently requests the Commission to make the following amendments to 
its proposal pursuant to Article 149, second paragraph, of the EEC Treaty. 
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TEXT PROPOSED UY THE ( OMI\IISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN ('01\1!\IUNITIES 1 
AMENDED TEXT 
Council directive on 
harmonization of systems of company taxation 
and of withholding taxes on dividends 
Preamble and recitals unchanged 
Articles 1 to 3 unchanged 
Article 4 Article 4 
1. A dividend distributed by a corpora- 1. Unchanged 
tion of a Member State shall confer on 
its recipient a right to a tax credit at 
the rate referred to in Article 8, 
provided: 
a) that he is resident in a Member State, 
and 
b) that he is subject to a tax on income 
or profits in such a way that the full 
amount of the dividend increased by 
the tax credit is taken into account 
in arriving at the amount of his 
taxable income or profits. 
2. By way of derogation from the 2. Unchanged 
provisions of paragraph 1 b), the tax 
credit may be granted to a person resident 
in a Member State who is exempt from all 
tax on income or profits either in respect 
of the whole of his income or in respect 
of that part of it consisting of dividends, 
provided that the person in question is an 
institution which is of public interest. 
If use is made of this option, the 
tax credit shall be granted whatever the 
Member State in which the dividends have 
their source. 
3. By way of derogation from the 
provisions of paragraph 1 b) the tax 
credit may be granted to the recipient 
of a dividend where, for reasons of 
administrative convenience, final 
taxation is levied, whether by means 
of a withholding tax or otherwise, 
on the amount of the dividend not 
increased by the tax credit. 
3 • Unchanged 
1 For complete text see OJ No. C 253, 5.11.1975, p.2 
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TEXT PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
4. The Council, acting by qualified 
majority on a proposal of the 
Commission, shall in case of need 
adopt any measures necessary for the 
application of the provisions of 
paragraph 2, first subparagraph, and 
paragraph 3. 
AMENDED TEXT 
4. The Council, acting by qualified 
majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, shall adopt any administra-
tive measures necessary for the 
application of the provisions of 
paragraph 2, first subparagraph, and 
paragraph 3. 
Article 5 unchanged 
Article 6 
By way of derogation from the 
provisions of Article 4, paragraph l, 
tax credits may, pursuant to double 
taxation agreements, be granted in 
whole or in part to persons resident 
in third countries. In no circumstances, 
however, may such persons be treated more 
favourably than persons resident in the 
Community. 
The Member States shall 
co-operate with each other and with 
the Commission with a view to adopting 
a common position on this matter. 
Article 6 
_!. By way of derogation from the 
provisions of Article 4, paragraph 1, 
tax credits may, pursuant to double 
taxation agreements, be granted in 
whole or in part to recipients of 
dividends resident in third countries, 
with due regard to possible reciprocal 
arrangements. 
The Member States shall cooperate 
with the Commission with a view to 
adopting a common position which will 
facilitate imputation between Member 
States and third countries. 
2. Recipients of dividends resident 
in third countries shall not receive 
more favourable treatment than 
residents in the Community. 
Articles 7 to 23 unchanged 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. Introduction 
1. The Commission took its first practical steps to~ards the harmonization 
of direct taxes as long ago as 1969, when it submitted proposals for 
directives on the common tax arrangements applying to mergers, divisions 
and contributions of assets between companies in different Member States1 
and on the common tax arrangements applying to parent companies and 
subsidiaries in different Member States2• 
The European Parliament delivered detailed opinions on both of these 
proposals3 ' 4 . However, the Council has not yet adopted either of the 
directives, arguing inter alia that systems of company taxation should be 
harmonized first. 
2. These specific proposals suggested that the Commission would soon 
submit a comprehensive proposal for the harmonization of systems of company 
taxation, especially since, in its resolution Bf- 22 March 19715, the 
Council called on the Commission to submit such a proposal for harmonization. 
At the end of 1972 it was learned that the Commission of the Six had decided 
in favour of the 'classical' system of company taxation. 
After many years of investigations and consultations the Commission 
subsequently changed its views and submitted the present proposal for a 
directive, which is based on the 'partial imputation system'. 
The importance of this Commission proposal cannot be overestimated. It 
is a first decisive step towards the elimination of the fiscal distortions 
of competition facing undertakings in the Comrnon Market. The proposal 
has far-reaching implications not only for fiscal law but also for 
competition and company law. It therefore calls for detailed consideration6 • 
l OJ No.C 39, 22.3.1969, p.l 
2 OJ No.C 39, 22.3.1969, p.7 
3 ARTZINGER report, Doc. 206/69, 3.2.1970 
4 ROSSI report, Doc. 195/69, 2.2.1970 
5 
6 
OJ No C.28, 27.3, 1971 
The Committee on Budgets has been considering the proposal for a directive 
since March 1976. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs delivered 
its opinion on 26 January 1977 (draftsman: Mr COUSTE - PE 42.703/final). 
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3. First and foremost, it should be pointed out that the Commission 
proposes the following two stages for its project: 
1. Harmonization of systems 
2. Harmonization of rates. 
The proposal for a directive under consideration relates only to the 
harmonization of systems, i.e. the purpose is not yet to harmonize bases 
of assessment, provisions on the determination of the profits of undertakings 
or tax rates. 
Articles 3 and 8 of the proposal merely lay down maximum and minimum 
limits for rates of corporation tax and for tax credits, leaving the Member 
States a sufficient amount of latitude. 
Thus, the scope of the proposal is restricted to the introduction of a 
harmonization system which only sets a quantitative framework for the actual 
taxes themselves. This system is not intended to provide tax cuts or rebates. 
National budget·revenues will remain unaffected. If a Member State wishes to 
impose heavier taxes or provide greater tax relief, it will still be able to 
do so. 
II. The need for harmonization 
4. The following systems of company taxation are applied in the Community: 
the partial imputation system or similar systems in Belgium, France, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland; 
the full imputation system in the Federal Republic of Germany; and 
the ~lassical' system in Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
The coexistence of these very different systems has many adverse effects 
of the Common Market. 
(a) The_aim of_the_Treati 
5. The criteria for deciding whether the legislation on direct taxation, 
and in particular company taxation, stands in need of harmonization and, if 
so, what system should be adopted are based first and foremost on the EEC 
Treaty itself. In addition, the general principles of fiscal law common to 
all the Member States should also be taken into account. Under Article 100 
of the EEC Treaty, the prime consideration is the 'functioning of the Common 
Market' in conditions of undistorted and equal competition. An important factor 
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in this connection is the general legal principle of fairness and uniformity of 
taxation. The Common Market will function at its best internally when the 
relevant free movement of capital (Articles 67 and GS of the EEC Treaty) is 
also ensured through the elimination, by means of the approximation of 
legislation, of indirect obstacles to trade in the form of fiscal barriers. 
6. Thus, the approximation of legislation on company tax has the following 
two main objectives: liberalization, i.e. the elimination, for the purposes 
of the free movement of capital, of differences in legislation which 
constitute barriers to trade; and economic non-discrimination, i.e. the 
guaranteeing, by means of economically neutral non-discriminatory conditions, 
of equality of competition between limited companies themselves and between 
such companies and partnerships and other economic entities. Thus, the 
approximation of legislation should be seen exclusively as a functional 
measure. It is not an end in itself. 
(b) The_economic_Eolicr_arguments 
7. A free and common capital market can be created only if the free move-
ment of capital is guaranteed. However, non-harmonized systems of company 
taxation give rise to economically unsound movements of capital as a factor 
of production and impede its optimal utilization. 
8. Moreover, the present situation in the Community prevents choices of 
location from being made exclusively on the basis of economic factors. 
Because of the different taxes on profits, fiscal considerations play an 
increasingly important part in decisions on where to invest. 
9. In the field of indirect taxation, the Member States of the Community 
have reached agreement on VAT. No such agreement has yet been reached in 
the field of direct taxation. Thus, the different systems of company 
taxation are bound to lead to considerable distortions of competition and are 
therefore directly at variance with the objectives of the EEC Treaty. 
10. The lack of uniformity in the taxation of shareholders is another 
argument in favour of harmonization. It is economically wrong for investors 
to be forced to go to certain Member States for tax reasons. It should be 
possible for decisions on investments to be based without exception on 
economic considerations. 
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(c) The_Eolitical_objective 
11. The Council expressly called for company tax reform in its decision of 
22 March 1971. This requirement must be met. In 1971 the principle of the 
reform was embodied in the Council decision on economic and monetary union. 
However, the postponement of the introduction of economic and monetary union 
cannot be allowed to override the Council's political determination to 
achieve harmonization in the field of direct taxation. 
12. We can therefore conclude that harmonization is most definitely 
necessary. 
III. Existing systems of company taxation 
(a} The_classical'_srstem 
13. Under the 'classical' system profits are subject to double taxation. 
They are first taxed at company level and are then subject to income tax 
after distribution to shareholders. If the sharehold~r is a limited company, 
the profits are once again subject to corporation tax. Thus, this system is 
quite different from the one used for taxing partnership profits. The 
latter are distributed between the partners and are subject to tax at that 
level but not at the level of the partnership itself. 
(b) Full_i111Eutation 
14. As the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs rightly 
points out, the Commission proposal is based only on the choice between the 
'classical' system and the partial imputation system. Hence the explicit 
reference here to the full imputation system. Under this system the profits 
of undertakings are also fully subject to corporation tax, but if they are 
distributed this tax is deductible in its entirety from the income tax 
liability of the shareholder. If the amount of deductible corporation tax 
is higher than the income tax liability, the excess is refunded. The 
basis of assessment for income tax consists of two components, namely the 
distributed basic dividends plus the amount payable in the form of refundable 
corporation tax; i.e. the amount payable in the form of refundable corpor-
ation tax is subject to income tax at the level of the shareholder. 
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(c) Partial_imEutation 
15. Under the partial imputation system, however, corporation tax is only 
partly allowable against income tax. The double taxation of dividends is 
partially alleviated by means of a tax credit. Under this procedure, the 
basis of assessment is increased by the amount of the tax credit, i.e. the 
credit is taxed as an additional yield from the share, exactly as in the 
case of full imputation. The tax credit is granted in the form of fixed 
percentage of the dividends. Variable credits have scarcely ever been used 
because of the technical complications they give rise to. 
(d) The_sElit_rate 
16. Until recently the Federal Republic of Germany applied the split-rate 
system, whereby distributed profits were only partially subject to 
corporation tax, while non-distributed profits were fully taxed. This split-
rate corporation tax has the disadvantage that any relief under this system 
automatically applies equally to all shareholders alike. 
The subsidiary system of primary dividends is no longer of any 
importance and is not now used to provide tax relief in the European legal 
system. 
IV. The disadvantages of the 'classical' system 
(a) The equation of distributed and non-distributed profits 
17. Under the 'classical' system, non-distributed and distributed profits 
are necessarily placed on an equal footing. Where corporation tax rates 
are relatively high, the double burden imposed on distributed profits gives 
rise, from the economic point of view, to over-taxation. This gives 
excessive encouragement to financing through borrowing. On the other hand, 
relatively low rates of corporation tax result in the undertaxation of non-
distributed profits and give rise to undesirable levels of self-financing. 
Since they naturally have more to gain from such internal increases in 
capital, the 'classical' system on the whole favours major shareholders 
and represents an obstacle to a broader spread of share capital. 
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(b) Lack_of_neutralitx_with_regard_to_the_taxation_of_the_various_forms 
of_undertakin9 
18. One of the important disadvantages of the 'classical' system is that 
taxation varies depending on the legal form of the uudertaking. The fact 
that an economic inevitability such as taxation is based on the legal form 
of the undertaking, which is largely optional, represents a considerable 
obstacle to the desired aim of achieving neutrality in company law. 
(c) Encouragement_of_tax_avoidance 
19. The 'classical' system provides only for the corporation tax - usually 
25% - to be deducted on dividend payments at source. On the whole, this 
does not seem to be enough to safeguard against fiscal irregularities in 
subsequent taxation, which would have serious consequences for the exchequers 
concerned. Under the partial imputation system, on the other hand, the tax 
credit acts as a payment on account and therefore has a safeguarding effect. 
V. The negative aspects of full imputation, the split-rate 
system and primary dividends 
(a) Full_illl]?utation 
20. An analysis of the systems of company taxation at present used in the 
Member States shows that the only alternative to the choice between the non-
relief and full relief of double taxation is a compromise in the form of 
partial imputation. 
21. The transition from the 'classical' system to full relief could not be 
achieved without losses of revenue for the exchequers of the Member States 
concerned. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the need to base the 
rate of corporation tax on the maximum rates of income tax would cause very 
difficult problems in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which apply 
maximum income tax rates of 70 and 90% respectively. 
22. Since all systems of relief call for fiscal compensation between the 
Member States, the full imputation system would serve to make the situation 
even worse. In the case of shareholders resident abroad, the source state 
would be left with absolutely no revenue from the corporation tax on 
distributed profits. In the case of parent corporations and subsidiaries 
the problem of fiscal compensation would become impossibly complicated. 
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(b) The_sElit-rate_system 
23. The split-rate system previously used in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, i.e. the application of different rates of corporation tax to 
distributed and non-distributed profits, has manifestly been unsuccessful. 
It has the disadvantage that relief is automatically given to all share-
holders alike. However, it is better for the exchequer if, within the 
framework of a flexible system which allows for exceptions, it grants tax 
privileges to shareholders only in individual cases where it considers they 
would be politically justifiable. 
24. The Member States should not be deprived of this flexibility by a 
European proposal for harmonization since this could also be interpreted as 
unacceptable interference in the affairs of the national tax authorities. 
(c) Primary_dividends 
25. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has rightly complained 
that the Commission proposal contains no opinion on the system of 
preferentially taxed primary dividends. Even if this method has no chance 
of success in the Common Market, the Commission should nevertheless have 
given the European Parliament its reasons for rejecting it so that the 
Community institutions could reach a balanced decision on this important 
proposal for harmonization. 
VI. The advantages of the partial imputation system 
26. The partial imputation system represents a compromise between the 
two most divergent systems, i.e. full imputation and unrelieved double 
taxation ('classical' system). 
With this proposal for harmonization, the Community, which must take 
account of the different national forms of industrial financing, share 
markets and companies, will be working towards a politically acceptable 
'common denominator'. No political value judgement by the various parties 
can fail to come down in favour of partial imputation, which best conforms 
to: 
- the principle of taxation on the basis of productivity, 
- the principle of the uniformity of taxation, and 
- social policy requirements. 
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27. The partial imputation system makes it possible to harmonize systems 
without affecting in any way the budgetary revenue of the Member States. 
This increases the likelihood of successful implementation of ~he directive. 
28. The partial imputation system is more neutral than the other systems 
with regard to the various forms of company. On the one hand it prevents 
the fiscal penalization of small limited companies (family businesses), 
which was a disadvantage of the classical system, and on the other it deals 
flexibly with the advantage of limited-liability capital accumulation, 
which the full imputation system could not do. 
29. The proposed system encourages a socially desirable increase in the 
spread of production capital and would thus inject new vigour into the 
capital market by inducing small savers to buy shares. 
30. In combination with the additional withholding tax, the tax credit, 
which amounts to a payment of tax on account, gives rise to a total 
deduction at source of about 50%, which can be considered a suitable safe-
guard against tax avoidance. 
VII. The application of the imputation system by and 
between Member States 
(a) Com~ensatory_tax 
31. Tax credits are intended to provide relief only in cases where 
economic double taxation actually exists. However, under the fiscal 
systems of all the Member States, there are a number of instances in which 
little if any corporation tax is levied. Variable tax credits cannot be 
used in such cases because the system would be impractical at income tax 
level. The Commission's proposal therefore makes provision for the 
introduction only of a fixed-rate tax credi~. As a result,a compensatory 
tax is to be imposed on companies distributing profits with a view to 
neutralizing the uniform tax credit in cases where corporation tax has not 
been charged at the normal rate (Article 9). This is what France does 
by means of the 'precompte' (advance payment) system. 
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(b) Parent_corEorations_and_subsidiaries_as_a_single_economic_unit 
32. Article 10 of the Commission's proposal relates to the application 
of the imputation system to parent corporations and subsidiaries. In 
this connection the principle of non-discrimination requires that direct 
and indirect shareholders shall be treated in the same way. Thus, the 
tax credits on dividends received from subsidiaries within the previous 
five financial years and redistributed by the parent corporation are to 
be included in the basis of assessment for the compensatory tax 
(prepayment) to which the parent corporation .is liable and then offset 
against the amount of that tax. In this way, parent corporations and 
subsidiaries are treated as a single economic unit and the imputation 
system is applied logically to this unit. 
However, it would be far too complicated to repay compensatory tax 
by offsetting it against the income tax of dividend recipients. This 
represents a departure from the objective of maintaining the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
(c) Fiscal_comEensation_between_Member_States 
33. Under Article 5 of the Commission's proposal tax credits are to be 
granted by the Member State to whose income tax or corporation tax the 
dividend recipients are subject. 
The partial imputation system therefore gives rise to practical 
difficulties in cases where distributions are made between Member States, 
i.e. either from a corporation based in one Member State to a shareholder 
resident in another or by a parent corporation based in one Member State 
to a subsidiary based in another or vice versa. 
34. Under the partial imputation system tax previously paid is deducted 
by means of a tax credit offset against the dividend recipient's income 
tax liability in the Member State in which he is resident. This 
necessitates fiscal compensation between the Member State in which the 
corporation has its seat and the state in which the state in which the 
shareholder is resident. In order to ensure that this particularly 
important procedure can in fact be carried out, further measures for the 
detailed implementation of Articles 4 to 9 (for example with a view to 
establishing a clearing office) must be adopted on the basis of 
Article 4(4). 
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35. Moreover, provisions for the standardization of the tax credit 
forms are essential for the purposes of efficient administration and 
hence for the liberalization of the movement of capital within the 
Community and the facilitation of the transfrontier activities of 
limited companies. 
It is regrettable that the Commission's proposal does not give 
clear expression to these requirements. The broad outlines of 
possible implementing provisions should at least have been included 
in the explanatory memorandum. 
VIII. Proposals for improvements to facilitate the application 
of the partial imputation system 
36. In keeping with the European Parliament's resolution of 
2 February 1970 on the proposal from the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Council for a directive on the common tax arrangements 
applying to parent companies and subsidiaries in different Member States1, 
it is appropriate for Article 2 of this directive also to take the actual 
place of work of an undertaking as the criterion determining the seat of 
that undertaking. This principle, unlike the incorporation theory, holds 
that profits should be taxed in the place where they are actually made. 
It has therefore been necessary to amend the first indent of Article 2 
accordingly. 
37. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3 m~ke provision for derogations 
which, in certain circumstances, could undermine the efforts to introduce 
a harmonized system. The possibility of exemption from corporation tax 
should not therefore be formulated in such general terms even at this 
early stage, i.e. the directive on approximation, since the Member States 
might be tempted to compete for the title of the country with the most 
liberal or most liberally operated tax system, using the derogation clause 
as a loophole. Careful wording of the derogation clause is accordingly 
just as important for fiscal neutrality as the principle laid down in 
Article 3(1). It has therefore been necessary to propose a new version 
of Article 3(2). 
38. In its opinion on this subject, the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs went even further and called for the derogations provided 
for in Article 3(2) and (3) to be granted only the basis of a decision 
taken by the Community institutions. The Committee on Budgets welcomes 
1 ROSSI report, Doc. 195/69 2.2.1970 
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this proposal but considers it to be unrealistic at the present time. 
Its ultimate effect would be to give one of the Community institutions 
the power to encroach on the fiscal jurisdiction of the Member States. 
Given the present state of Community integration, this could well 
jeopardize the implementation of the directive on harmonization. 
39. The proposed amendment to Article,4(4) is intended to draw 
attention to the absolute necessity for provisions to ensure the 
efficient application of the administrative procedure. Such measures 
would. include a standard form for tax credits. Experience in the field 
of customs law should be used as a model in this connection. 
40. A completely new wording is proposed for Article 6. First and 
foremost it is not clear why the conclusion of double taxation agreements 
should only benefit individuals and not companies in third countries. 
For this reason the term 'persons' should be replaced by the more general 
expression 'recipients of dividends'. 
41. Moreover, it would appear absolutely essential to encourage the 
conclusion of double taxation agreements with third countries as a means 
of preventing a protectionist isolation of the European capital market 
from the world market. Liberalization of the movement of capital within 
the Community should not in any way result in discrimination against 
direct investments from third countries. Since the Community is in any 
case in danger of having protectionist methods forced upon it in other 
fields, liberalization is also to be called for vis-a-vis third countries. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS 
Draftsman: Mr COUSTE 
On 3 October 1975 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr Coust~ draftsman. 
It considered the Commission's proposal and the draft opinion at its 
meetingsof 21 October and 18 November 1975, 17 February, 13 April, 30 Sep-
tember, 22 November 1976 and 26 January 1977. At its meeting of 
26 January 1977, it adopted the draft opinion by 10 votes to 3 with 3 
abstentions. 
Present: Mr Van der Hek, chairman; Mr Notenboom and Sir Brandon 
Rhys Williams, vice-chairmen; Mr Coust~, draftsman; Lord Ardwick, 
Mr ClerfaYt, Mr Dykes, Mr Hougardy, Mr Lange, Mr Leonardi, Mr Martens 
(deputizing for Mr Ripamonti), Mr Van der Mei, Mr Normanton, Mr Prescott, 
Mr Starke and Mr Thornley. 
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PRESENT STATE OF TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE COMMUNITY 
1. Little progress has so far been made, whether in the harmonization 
of indirect taxes, of VAT, or of various excise duties, and less still in 
the area of direct taxation; the delay is due essentially to the lack of 
political resolve on the part of the Council. In a most timely recent 
communication (Doc. COM(75) 391/fin) the Commission has drawn up a programme 
of measures to be taken in the fiscal area in the next three years. 
Harmoniza~ion of company taxation and of withholding taxes is one of the 
measures which it is essential to introduce in 1975 and is the subject of the 
proposal for the directive under consideration here. 
2. It is clear from the Commission's explanatory memorandum that 
considerable differences exist at present between the EEC Member Sta1:J:ls, 
both as regards the rates and the principles of taxing company profits. 
Thus, the tax rate on distributed profits ranges from 30% in the 
Federal Republic of Germany to 52% in the United Kingdom. What is more, 
there are cases of double taxation of company profits, to the detriment 
of shareholders. 
These tax disparities within the Community represent an obstacle to 
genuine integration of the Member States' economies. They lead to distortions 
of competition, to inequality of treatment of shareholders in different Member 
States, and they may have a serious effect on investments (when shareholders 
are subject to double taxation, investment tends to be financed almost solely 
from retained profits). These considerations show why the necessary harmon-
ization of company taxation and withholding tax systems is of great importance, 
not only from the point of view of the reorganization of the Member States' 
tax procedures, but also for the tax payers - and thus not only falls within 
the competence of the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsibl9 but 
also has an economic aspect. 
Improvement of the tax system is bound to have important repercussions on 
the economic behaviour of each Member State and it would clearly be impossible 
to try to achieve total harmonization at once. 
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MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION 
3. The Commission's proposal takes account of these facts and is no more 
than a first step towards gradual harmonization. 
It will be convenient to examine the proposed measures from the angle 
of their application to companies, to dividend-drawing shareholders, and 
to Member States respectively. 
(a) Taxation of company profits 
4. The differences between the rates of corporate profits taxation 
obtaining at present in various Member States are at the root of inequalities 
in the conditions of competition and of abnormal capital movements and they 
play an important part in the choice of the place of business. The Commission 
proposes the establishment of a 'normal' taxation rate, ranging between 45% 
and 55% to replace the rates applicable so far. This undoubtedly is a step 
in the right direction. 
5. However, this progressive provision is immediately hedged with a 
number of derogations listed in Article 3 (2) and (3) which are so extensive 
that it may be justifiably asked whether in practice they do not reduce 
excessively the scope of the initial provision. 
Article 3 (2) permits the application of a rate different from the 
normal rate, or complete exemption, in a Member State, in particular cases 
and for well-defined reasons of economic, regional, or social policy. And 
this derogation may be invoked on a permanent basis. A Member State wishing 
to avail itself of this option should first consult the Commission, but if 
the commission opposes the measures proposed by the Member State, there is no 
provision for any Community procedure to approve or reject these measures and 
the Member State may put them into effect after 30 days - the period granted 
to the Commission to express its views - or after the Commission has made its 
views known. Article 3 (3) permits Member States to apply, for the purpose of 
regulating the economy, tempo~a:ir1 increases or reductions of corporation tax. 
This derogation does not even require consultation with the Commission. 
6. What is more, Article 2 (2) exempts from the provisions of the directive 
dividends received by the beneficiary through the intermediary of investment 
funds and leaves the regulation of such transactions to a future special 
technical directive. Pending harmonization in this area, Member States are 
free to settle for themselves the problems posed by dividends which are 
transmitted through financial intermediaries of the portfolio investment 
type. Lack of harmonization in this area, once harmonization of company 
taxation and withholding tax systems has been achieved, iB likely not only 
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to perpetuate but to exacerbate the chances of distortion. Without this 
harmonization, persons preferring to have the investment of their savings 
managed by specialized intermediaries will probably, in some Member States, 
find themselves penalized fiscally, compared with those undertaking other 
investment activities. This will inevitably result in a disturbance of the 
market and a switching of funds to ordinary shares. 
The committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs therefore urges the 
Commission to submit as soon as possible a proposal concerning this area 
of taxation so that the appropriate directive may be adopted immediately 
after the general directive. 
(b) Tax credits for shareholders 
7. The Commission states that studies have shown that only two systems 
of company taxation merited consideration: the 'classical' system and the 
imputation system. 
However, in its 1967 'Programme for the harmonization of direct taxes• 1 , 
the commission did consider the split-rate system as one that could be extended 
throughout the Community on the same basis as the imputation system. The 
Commission also claims that the system involving deduction of a primary dividend 
from corporate profits is also now out of the question. It may be that these 
systems do not merit consideration but the Commission could have at least given 
its reasons. 
8. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs agrees with the Commission 
that the imputation system has many advantages compared with the classical 
system. The common imputation system, or the 'tax credit' system, ensures greater 
neutrality of taxation as regards the source of investment, since double taxation 
encourages self-financing as against financing from outside sources. The Commission, 
however, is probably being somewhat over optimistic in stating that the imputation 
system 'tends to put loan and equity financing on a more equal footing.' In the 
'Programme for the harmonization of direct taxes' the Commission states: 
"If the systems of tax credit and split rates do in fact reduce 'double economic 
taxation', they do not appear to appeal to shareholders to the extent expected, 
nor have they solved the problem of the excessive preference given by companies 
to loans for financing operations. 112 The question then arises as to whether, 
since those words were written, the preference for loan financing has diminished. 
The tax-credit with its higher rate of corporation tax, also ensures 
greater neutrality with regard to the various legal forms of undertakings. The 
gap between corporate taxation rates and the rates levied directly on one-
man businesses at the level, respectively, of the owner or of the partners in 
the enterprise, is smaller under the imputation system than under the 'classical• 
1 Supplement to Bulletin of the EEC No. 8 - 1967 
2
see Supplement to Bulletin of the EEC No. 8-1967 'Programme for the harmoniza-
tion of direct taxes,' p.14 
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one. 
In addition, the system ensures greater f~irness of taxation. The 
'classical' system has th<! effect of making shareholders whose rate of 
personal income tax is low subject to a tax burden which is relatively 
heavier than that of shareholders whose rate of personal income tax is 
high. The imputation system reduces this burden for small shareholders. 
What is more, the classical system promotes ploughing back rather than 
distribution of profits, to the disadvantage of small shareholders who 
are primarily interested in an income from their shares. 
The rate of corporate taxation is higher under the imputation than 
under the 'classical' system and thus closer to the maximum rate of income 
tax, thereby discouraging tax avoidance. 
Finally, as we have already observed, the imputation system seems more 
likely to attract to the investment market medium- or even small-scale 
savers, an important factor for the future development of the share market. 
9. An argument against the imputation system ts th~t, to a greater 
extent than the 'classical' system, it has an incidence on prices. It 
is generally admitted that proportionate taxes on profits can be more easily 
offset by raising prices than personal income-tax. On this reasoning it might 
be concluded that - in an imputation system in which corporate taxes are 
relatively higher than taxes on income - the tax burden is more likely to be 
shifted to prices than under the 'classical' systems, even though the 
shareholder is given a tax credit to allow for the tax paid by the company. 
Studies show that the burden of taKation is passed on in extremely complex 
ways. Account must also be taken of the effect of other =actors, such as 
profit retention or distribution on the shifting of the tax burden. An 
analysis by Professor Dr. s. J. van den Tempel1 suggests that there is no 
certainty that any one system more than another causes taxes to be passed 
on in prices. 
10. In view of these considerations the Commission's choice of tax credits 
can be approved, but with the reservation that other systems should have 
been examined in the analysis on which the commission bases its choice. 
(c) Harmonization of systems of withholding tax at source: fiscal 
cooperation among Member States 
11. A wide variety of rates apply to the withholding at source of taxes 
on dividends. The tax on the same amount of revenue may vary from Oto 30 
per cent. Moreover, the final tax burden to which a recipient of dividends 
1
see 'Studies'No. 15-1970 'Corporation tax and individual income tax in the 
European Communities', p. 15 
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or interest on bonds is subject varies according to the EEC country in 
which these revenues arise; the disparities are due to the fact that, 
depending on the individual case, the tax withheld at source is not, is 
only partly, or is totally charged to personal tax liability, or is even 
refunded. 
Added to these discrepancies there are differences in the methods 
and the efficienay· of the control of the final tax charged on dividends 
paid to residents of the Member States. 
It must therefore be realized that the method of withholding of tax 
at source as practised currently in the Member States, and in spite of 
alleviation by existing conventions to prevent double taxation, continues 
to result in double taxation or in over-taxing as well as in complications 
for the potential investor and is the cause of abnormal movements of capital. 
12. To mitigate these disadvantages, the proposal for a directive envisages 
(in Article 14(1)) that, in respect of third countries, each Member State 
shall impose a withholding tax at a standard rate of 25% on dividends 
distributed by the corporations of that State, no matter who is the recipient 
of these dividends. 
In the Commission's view this deduction at source is essential to prevent 
fiscal fraud. The rate of 25% proposed by the Commission for the withholding 
tax on distributed dividends would have the effect of raising the total amount 
levied, allowing for tax credit, to approximately 50%, or close to the rate of 
personal income tax, thus assuring fairness of taxation and discouraging 
fiscal fraud. 
On the other hand, the proposal provides (Article 14(2)) that there 
shall be no deduction at source on a dividend distributed by a subsidiary 
to a parent corporation resident in any Member State. 
Finally, Article 16 establishes a common system for setting off the 
withholding tax against the amount of the tax on income or profits to 
which the recipient of the dividends is liable. 
Such a Community system of tax deduction at source would represent 
real progress: there would be no more double taxation; thanks to the 
common system of calculating and setting off the standard-rate deductions 
at source, there would be an end to abnormal movements of capital due 
to the present fiscal disparities. 
(d) Tax cooperation among Member States 
13. The implementation of the provisions of this proposal for a directive 
would imply fairly close fiscal cooperation among the Member States, both 
- 26 - PE 49.828/fin. 
in granting tax credits and in offsetting deductions at source. 
Such cooperation would also be needed in the sharing out of the 
budgetary costs of tax credit (Article 13(3) and (5) ), where dealings 
between subsidiary and parent companies domiciled in different Member 
States are concerned. In respect of third countries, Article 6 stipulates 
that Member States shall cooperate with a view to adopting a common position. 
The Commission considers that its proposals go sufficiently far in 
reducing the technical difficulties involved. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: 
(a) is of the opinion that the objective of the proposal is to establish 
neutrality of taxation with regard to capital movements between Member 
States, an objective which the European Parliament has always supported; 
(b) is of the opinion that the system of corporate taxation chosen should 
not discourage risk capital as a means of finanaing ~ssential investments 
in the present conjunctural and structural economic crisis; 
(c) feels that the Commission should not have restricted its choice of 
Community system to the alternative between the imputation system and 
the 'classical' system; 
(d) is of the opinion that the derogations provided for in Article 3(2) and 
(3) should only be granted on the basis 9f a decision taken by the 
Community Institutions; 
{e) urges the Commission to submit as soon as possible a proposal for a 
special directive dealing with investment funds so that this directive 
can be adopted immediately after the general directive; 
(f) feels that the effort to eliminate distortions of competition involves 
not only harmonizing systems of company taxation and withholding taxes 
on dividends but also harmonizing the basis of assessment and the rate 
of company taxation; 
(g) stresses - contrary to the piecemeal approach adopted by the Commission-
the need for overall fiscal harmonization and therefore insiijts that 
the objective of harmonizing the basis of assessment and the rate of 
company taxation should be further pursued; 
(h) notes that the absence of harmonization referred to in po:ints (f) and 
(g) partly accounts for the current divergence in the economies of the 
Member States; 
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(i) considers that, in the inb~rest·-:1 ·:>E El-.,~-tl equity, it is of the highest 
importance to a__void creating a situation more favourable to capit"l-
derived than to labour-derived income. 
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